THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

However, the same argument adduced above with respect to preferences may
be made against the position that superseniority under the circumstances of the
Cutler-Hammercase is unlawful discrimination. The prohibition of Section 8(3)reenacted in Section 8(a) (3) was not aimed at, andhas never beeninterpretedas aimed at, union-security devices. It is nevertheless conceivable that courts may find
that non-union employees are in fact discriminated against where there is superseniority, since this device sets a premium on joining the union to secure special
advantages. Only union officials may enjoy them, and one cannot be a union
official without joining the union. But this argument seems far-fetched, and is
not compelling in light of the practical need for superseniority in successful
administration of a collective-bargaining agreement. Indeed it seems clear that,
as a matter of policy, superseniority should not be prohibited as an unfair labor
practice. While the privileges of superseniority cannot guarantee responsible
union leadership-a matter with which the membership must be concernedsuch advantages make the duties of leadership more attractive to capable men
who might otherwise forego the holding of union offices. Moreover, superseniority by encouraging continuity of experienced union leadership contributes
substantially to the smooth operation of grievance machinery, the lack of
which has in the past been a fertile source of industrial unrest; and it assures
the constant contacts necessary for the successful negotiation of future contracts. Therefore continued recognition of superseniority for union officers as
lawful might well operate to further the objectives of the LMRA by promoting
stability in the collective-bargaining relationship.

THE CHENERY CASE AGAIN
Law in the courts, as the realists insist andmost students admit, is not the
unchanging, self-consistent body of rules which some might wish it to be.
Nevertheless, one of the reigning conventions in the drafting of majority opinions requires that it be given that appearance whenever possible. But occasionally a court finds itself in a position where this convention cannot be served if the
court's true opinion is to be voiced, as, for example, when more or less controlling
decisions and the court's inclination in the instant case cannot be harmonized.
No court, regardless of its own opinion, will hear the merits of a dispute
which it considers already finally adjudicated between the parties.' Courts will,
Co., 68 F. Supp. x014 (N.Y.,.1946), rev'd i6 F. 2d 552 (C.C.A. 2d, 947); Droste v. NashKelvinator Corp., 64 F. Supp. 716 (Mich., 1946). In all these cases the propriety of superseniority for union officials was assumed and often served as an argument for similar provision
for veterans. One case held directly that a veteran is bound by the superseniority provisions
of a contract negotiated in his absence. Gauweiler v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp., 162 F. 2d 448, 451
(C.C.A. 3d, 1947). This case is distinguishable from the instant case in that a closed-shop
contract was involved.
',For a close case turning on this seemingly elementary principle, see Deposit Bank v.
Frankfort, 1g U.S. 499 (1903).
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however, overrule their own prior decisions in disputes between different parties
on the same facts if they feel that such a departure is justified in the light of
changed conditions or that the earlier decisions were erroneous;2 but the rule
of the decided cases is generally first given consideration. Somewhere between
the principles of res judicata and stare decisis lies the problem with which we are
concerned. It arises when an appellate court grants successive reviews of the
same case, and feels on a later review that one of its initial decisions on an issue
of law was incorrect. To deal with this problem the courts have developed the
doctrine of the "law of the case," which requires that the first ruling be adhered
to.3 But although it is the same dispute between the same parties, the case as a
whole has not been finally adjudicated, and some courts have held that there
are situations where a bald overruling of the earlier holding, now considered erroneous, is justified.4 When this is done, of course, the smooth-flowing "application of the relevant principles to the material facts" is conspicuously interrupted.
The Supreme Court recently found itself in a situation which threatened to
raise this problem. In a review of an SEC order, the majority of the Court were
in favor of sustaining it even though it was substantially the same as one remanded by the Court four years before in an earlier review of the same case.
In the time between the Commission's first order and its order on remand there
had been no changes in the fact situation imperatively calling for the re-entry
of an order not sustained on its first review s Nor had there been procedural
6
deficiencies in the Commission's first hearing which could have been cured.
Thus the view of the majority would have squarely raised the law of the case
problein, had it not been for a foothold offered by the ambiguity of the remanding opinion. This foothold was seized by the new majority, and by this means
it was able to sustain the Commission's order without overruling the Court's
earlier decision.
In September 1941 the Securities and Exchange Commission approved a
plan for the voluntary reorganization of the Federal Water Service Corpora2Smith v. Allwright,

321

U.S. 649 (1944), overruling Grovey v. Townsend,

295

U.S. 45

(1935); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), overruling Hammer v. Dagenbart,
247 U.S. 251 (1918); Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 3o4 U.S. 64 (1938), overruling Swift v. Tyson,

x6 Pet. (U.S.) 1 (1842).

33 Am. Jur., Appeal and Error, §§ 985-86 (1936); see Insurance Group Committee v.
Denver & R. G.W. R.Co., 329 U.S. 607, 612 (1947); Messinger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436,
444 (1912); Great Western Telegraph Co. v. Burnham, r62 U.S.. 339,343 (1896); Washington
Bridge Co. v. Stewart, 3 How. (U.S.) 413 (1845).
4McGovern v. Eckhart, 200 Wis. 64, 227 N.W. 3oo (1929); Johnson v. Cadillac Motor
Car Co., 261 Fed. 878 (C.C.A. 2d, 1919).
sSee FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 3o9 U.S. 134 (1940).
6See United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183 (1939); Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S.
364 (T939).

7Matter of Federal Water Service Corp., io S.E.C. 2oo ( 4i).
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tion,8 a public utility holding company registered under the Act of 1935.9 One
provision of the plan, included at the insistence of the Commission, was that
certain shares of Federal preferred, purchased by the company's officers and
directors during the period when they were presenting successive reorganization
plans for the consideration of the Commission staff, should be surrendered to
the reorganized corporation at cost plus 4 per cent interest. There was no evidence of actual abuse of their position as reorganization managers by these persons, and the Commission conceded that throughout the greater part of this
purchase program the management had made an "honest effort" to follow a
policy of buying only after any new reorganization developments had been
made public. The chief objective of the purchase program was to retain control
of the corporation after reorganization. This the management freely admitted.
Also, in the plan as submitted by the management, the book value of the new
common shares was to be considerably greater than that of the old preferred
shares which were to be exchanged for them; this disparity, however, was much
reduced in the plan as finally approved by the Commission,"0 and there was
never any difference between the increase in value of the management-held
shares and the increase in those held by the public.
In support of its order making its approval of the reorganization plan depend
upon the limitation of participation by the management-held stock in question
to cost plus accumulated dividends," the Commission relied chiefly on broad
judicial declarations of the requirement that a fiduciary shun any position in
even potential conflict with his duty of fidelity, and forego any profits accruing
to him as a result of having taken such a position.12 But it also cited the pre8Hereinafter referred

to as "Federal."

9Public Utility Holding Company Act, 49 Stat. 803 (1935), iS U.S.C.A. § 79 (1941). The
plan was considered by the Commission as subject, first, to § 7 of the Act, which provides for
Commission supervision of readjustment of capital structure for the company's own ends and
makes approval of proposals for such readjustments contingent on a finding by the Commission
that they will not be "detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors or consumers" and will not "result in an unfair or inequitable distribution of voting power" among
stockholders of the company, 49 Stat. 814 (1935), 15 U.S.C.A. § 799 (1941), and, second, to
§ ii, the so-called "death-sentence" section, which empowers the Commission to require,
along specified lines, reorganization and simplification of certain described holding companies
and holding company systems, but also provides for the submission of plans by the affected
companies themselves, designed to comply with these requirements. These plans the Commission is to judge -by the standard that they be "fair and equitable to the persons affected"
thereby. 49 Stat. 820 (i935), 15 U.S.C.A. § 79k (i94i).
10There is a detailed statement and analysis of the legal and financial background of the
case in the Commission's opinion in Matter of Federal Water Service Corp., 8 S.E.C. 893
(i941).
1 "Cost plus accumulated dividends" was later changed to "cost plus 4% interest."
10 S.E.C. 200 (1941).
12Matter of Federal Water Service Corp., 8 S.E.C. 893, 916-17 (194-1). The citations for
these broad principles were Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. (U.S.) 502, 507 (1846); Magruder v.
Drury, 235 U.S. io6, rig, 120 (1914); and Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 264 N.E. 545,
546 (1928). None of these cases, however, involved corporate officers and directors. To sup-
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Chandler Act13 judicial extensions of this principle, under Section 77B of the
Bankruptcy Act,'4 to "persons whose fiduciary position arises from the fact that
they act for others in the formulation of a reorganization plan."' s On the basis
of these authorities, the Commission found that "the provisions [in the plan
submitted by the management] for participation by the preferred stock held by
the management [resulted] in the terms of issuance of the new securities being
detrimental to the interests of investors and the plan being unfair and inequitable."'' 6 Thus the final finding on this question was couched in the language
of Sections 7 (d) (6) and ii(e) of the Holding Company Act 7 which charge the
Commission with the application of these standards. The Act was not, however,
specifically cited at this point, and the judicial authorities mentioned were the
only basis for the ruling clearly stated by the Commission.
On petition for review by the management, and by the company as an intervenor, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Justice Justin Miller
dissenting, reversed the order in a somewhat hostile opinion which denied the
applicability of the judicial authorities cited by the Commission and held that
the duties of holding company officers and directors with respect to the purchase and sale of stock in their own company were covered, and covered completely, by Section x7 of the Act,' 8 which had been fully complied with by the
petitioners.19
On certiorari, the Supreme Court held, four to three, that the Commission's
order could not be sustained on the authority of the equity precedents it had
cited, but nevertheless remanded the case for "such further proceedings, not
port the proposition that such persons "are fiduciaries," whose "powers are powers in trust,"
the Commission cited Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (i939), a case of blatantly fraudulent
manipulation of a one-man corporation.
"3Section 249 of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 9oi (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. § 649
(1946), codifies this principle with respect to persons acting "in a representative or fiduciary
capacity" in proceedings for corporate reorganization in bankruptcy, to the extent of denying
compensation for such services to such persons where they have traded in the stock of, or
claims against, the debtor without court permission.
X4

48 Stat. 912 (i934), as amended, ii U.S.C.A. § 207 (supp. 1937), now amended and

transferred by the Chandler Act.
'sMatter of Federal Water Service Corp., 8 S.E.C. 893, 917 (1941).
16Ibid., at 921.
1749 Stat. 8r5 and 820 (1935), i5 U.S.C.A. H6 79g(d)(6) and 79k(e) (1941). In addition,
§ 7 (f) [49 Stat. 815 (1935), i5U.S.C.A. § 79g(f) ('94')] empowers the Commission to attach
such terms and conditions to any order permitting a declaration to become effective as the
Commission finds necessary to assure compliance with all conditions specified in § 7.
" 49 Stat. 830 (i935), i5 U.S.C.A. § 79q (1941), requiring officers and directors to make

public all their trading in stock of their own companies, and providing for recapture by the
company of all profits made by such persons on described short-term trading.
"9Chenery Corp. v. SEC, 128 F. 2d 303 (App. D.C., 1942); see Stock Purchases by Directors During Voluntary Reorganization, xo Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 70 (1942); Chenery Corp. v.
SEC: Power of the SEC to Limit Directors' Purchases of Stock, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 126 (1942).
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inconsistent with [the Court's] opinion, as [might] be appropriate,"2 thus implying that some basis for the order might be found. The majority in this decision consisted of Chief Justice Stone, Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the opinion, and Justices Roberts and Jackson. In the minority were Justices Black,
Reed, and Murphy, who thought that the order should be sustained as it stood.
On remand, the Commission reaffirmed its original order on substantially the
same findings of fact. No bad faith on the part of Federals management was
revealed. The judicial authorities, however, were abandoned, and the new
order denying parity participation was grounded on the discretion vested in the
Commission by the Holding Company Act.21
On petition for review to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
that court again reversed the Commission, holding that the opinion of the
Supreme Court precluded the retroactive application of these limitations in the
absence of bad faith on the part of the management.But on certiorari the Supreme Court held, five to two, that the Commission's
order must now be sustained, since it had been given the proper statutory basis,
the absence of which had been considered fatal in the prior review.2 3 Thus the
result of this final decision is that sought by the dissenters to the Supreme
Court's earlier decision.
The former dissenters, Justices Black, Reed, and Murphy, along with two
new members of the court, Justices Rutledge and Burton,'2 4 now constitute the
majority, while Justice Frankfurter, the author of the majority opinion in the
first decision, and Justice Jackson, the only member remaining of those who
concurred, are now in dissent. Moreover, this reversal of roles was accomplished
without any overt departure by either majority or dissent from the majority
opinion in the 1943 decision-a tribute to that opinion's pliability.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's 1943 opinion is not easy to interpret. He agreed
with the Commission that "officers and directors who manage a holding company in process of reorganization under the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935 occupy positions of trust." But to say this "only begins analysis."'s
As the record showed no finding by the Commission of actual abuse of the
position of reorganization managers by Federal's officers and directors, he concluded that "some technical rule of law must have moved the Commission to
single out the respondents and deny their preferred stock the right to partici20 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943); see Dodd, The Chenery Corporation Case:
A New Landmark in the Law of Administrative Procedure, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 102 (1943).
21Matter of Federal Water Service Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 5584 (1945).
- Chenery Corp. v. SEC, 154 F. 2d 6 (App. D.C., 1946), noted I4Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 75
(1946).
23SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), rehearing den. 332 U.S. 783 (1947). The
majority opinion was published in June and the dissent was held over the summer and handed
down in October at the beginning of the new term.
24 Justice Burton concurred only in the result.
"sSEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 8o, 85, 86 (1943).
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pate equally in the reorganization."21 The rules of law in the cases cited by the
Commission were held not to support such a denial. "But these standards are
not static. In evolving standards of fairness and equity, the Commission is not
bound by settled judicial precedents. Congress certainly did not mean to preclude the formulation by the Commission of standards expressing a more sensitive regard for what is right and what is wrong than those prevalent at the time
of the adoption of the [Holding Company Act]." Here, however, the Commission had "explicitly disavowed any purpose of going beyond those [standards]
which the courts had theretofore recognized." Therefore, "its action must be
'
judged by the standards which [it] itself invoked." 27 He refused to follow the
Court of Appeals in its holding that "§ 17(a) and (b), which requires officer
and directors of any holding company registered under the act to file statements
of their security holdings in the company and provides that profits made from
dealing in such securities within any period of less than six months shall inure
to the benefit of the company" was a "limitation upon the power of the Commission to deal with other situations in which officers and directors have failed
to measure up to the standards imposed upon them by the Act." Rather "the
Commission could take appropriate action for the correction of reorganization
abuses found to be 'detrimental to the public interest of investors or consumers.'

"28

The most difficult and important question about the majority opinion is
what Justice Frankfurter intended to indicate would be sustainable as "appropriate action" by the Commission. There is one passage which, read alone,
seems to state clearly a conclusion that in the absence of bad faith only the enforcement of a general rule, adopted by the Commission before the fact under
its rule-making power, could be sustained.9 But at the close of the opinion, he
returned to a disapproval merely of the grounds on which the Commission had
purported to act. Since those grounds would not sustain the order, and no others
appeared, the Court was unable to perform its duties of review, and the case
must be remanded, seemingly so that the Commission might give reasons for the
order which would make it reviewable as an exercise of statutory discretion in0
stead of as an application of established law.3
The opinion has been the subject of some doubt and considerable speculation
since its publication. Mr. Justice Black, in his dissent, said that the Court
"apparently [held] that the Commission [had] full power to do exactly what it
did."31 Professor Dodd has said that "it is far from clear that the majority
opinion implies a denial of that power."32 Law-review comment has been split.33
30 Ibid., at 94-95.
2 Ibid., at 91-92.
"Ibid., at 86-87.
"1Ibid., at 99.
29 Ibid., at 92-93.
27Ibid., at 89.
32Dodd, op. cit. supra note 20, at ioo5.
33 Case notes on the first Supreme Court decision and the second Court of Appeals decision
have been far from unanimous in their interpretation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion.
Thus, "It is doubtful that the majority opinion of the Supreme Court precluded the Commission from prescribing a new standard of fiduciary duty for reorganization managers in a
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Interpreted as a remand for more adequate findings and a clarifying of the
Commission's theory of its authority and objectives, the 943 decision certainly could not be called unreasonable.34 A court charged by Congress with
,the review of administrative orders might conceivably feel at a loss when faced
with a casual application by an agency of a sanction hitherto unknown, with no
thorough exposition of its relation to the special field in which the agency is
expert and therefore vested with discretion. To affirm the order on its own
authority when the Commission had stated no sustainable basis for it, the
Court said, would be to invade the preserve of the Commission and to make a
policy determination which, though to some extent reviewable, belonged in the
first instance to the Commission.35 While there are some paradoxes in this situation, they are inescapable if judicial review of administrative decisions is to be
the rule. Certainly there is no dearth of instances where the Supreme Court has
refused to permit enforcement of administrative orders because the necessary
statutory or factual basis was not clearly stated.36
particular case." 59 Iarv. L. Rev. 459, 460 (1946). A note in41 Mich. L. Rev. 987 (i943) sees
no ambiguity in the decision and interprets it as merely remanding the case because a proper
basis for the order was not shown. 43 Col. L. Rev. 253 (i943) also notes no ambiguity, but gives
the decision a different emphasis from that of the Michigan note. "The Commissioner's order,"
it says, "could not be sustained. Had the Commission promulgated a general rule, of which
this order was a particular application, it would probably have been upheld as a correction of
an abuse 'detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors.'" To the author of
34 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 75, 77, 78, 79 (1946) it "hardly seems tenable" that "the Supreme Court
split four to three in the Chenery case merely because the majority wanted the SEC to indicate which of its powers was being exercised and to clarify the grounds upon which it was
acting. . . ." Instead this author suggests that the Court of Appeals, in its reversal of the Commission's second order, "perhaps properly [construed] Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion,"
although "there is support for both the SEC and the Court of Appeals in their conflicting interpretations of the overgenerous language of the Supreme Court opinion." 17 St. John's L.
Rev. 129, 130 (1943) says the Supreme Court in its first decision "for all practical purposes
...affirms" the Court of Appeals. "The majority opinion," this note continues, "is far from
clear as to just what finding the Commission would have to make without passing a general
rule."
34 The substantive questions raised by this litigation are beyond the scope of this note.
The persuasive arguments for sustaining the Commission's order at the outset, without remand, as a desirable extension of the conception of corporate powers as powers in trust, are
set forth in Stock Purchases by Directors During Voluntary Reorganization, io Univ. Chi. L.
Rev. 70 (1942), noting the first Court of Appeals decision. The author of that note emphasizes
the concurrence of the purchases in question with the reorganization proceedings as dis-

tinguishing this case from those where the right of officers and directors to trade in their company's securities is clearly recognized. The note calls attention to the federal courts' development and retroactive application of similar limitations to persons acting in representative
capacity in reorganization proceedings in bankruptcy.
This reasoning, however, is subjected to
3s SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 8o, 88 (i1943).
severe criticism by Justice Black in his dissent. Ibid., at 99 (1943).
36United States v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 315 U.S. 475, 488-89 (1942);
United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 294 U.S. 499 (i935); United States v.
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 293 U.S. 454, 463 (i935); Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194,
215 (1931). These were all suits to set aside or enjoin enforcement of administrative orders.
Apparently there was no occasion for a remand; the Court simply decided that because the
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If, however, the opinion is construed as denying the Commission the power
to proceed in a case-by-case development of the standards of the Act, and thus
precluding the proscription of the transactions here in question in the absence of
bad faith or a general prospective rule, the remand for further proceedings becomes hard to explain. It had become too late to adopt a prospective rule
applicable to the purchases involved here.
The remand could be reconciled with the second interpretation only by understanding it as looking toward a possible adducing by the Commission of
evidence of actual bad faith. Thus, even construing the opinion as a denial of
the Commission's power to apply the non-participation sanction retroactively
when no bad faith was shown, one could see some purpose in sending the case
back. But there is much language in the opinion to suggest that Justice Frankfurter was taking the management's good faith as established.
Whatever the intended meaning of the opinion, the Commission not unnaturally chose the first construction, and supported its new order with a
thorough exposition of its conception of its powers and duties under the Act,
the dominant position of the holding company management in the voluntary
reorganization proceedings provided for by the Act, and the possibilities of
abuse arising from the conflicting interests of the management in the instant
case. These considerations, it said, made it impossible to find affirmatively that
the plan was fair and equitable as required by Section ii(e).37 The Commission's opinion was meticulously drafted to conform to an interpretation of Justice Frankfurter's opinion as a remand for clarification of the Commission's
theory of its authority and objectives. If that interpretation was correct, the
Commission's new order certainly seemed to merit affirmance. But the Court
of Appeals reversed the Commission's order as not in conformity with the
Supreme Court's mandate.
The grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court gave promise of a final answer
to the debate over the meaning of the earlier decision, and to the broader
bases on which the orders were entered did not appear in reviewable form, they were unenforceable. There is no reason to suppose, however, that the agency concerned was not free to
take the matters in question up again.
In Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941), prominently cited and quoted in
the Chenery case, the Supreme Court conceded the bare legal power of the Board to order reinstatement of employees discharged for union activity, even though they had obtained substantially equivalent employment elsewhere. But the case was remanded for a showing by
the Board of how the enforcement of such an order would effectuate the policies of the National
Labor Relations Act in the particular case in question. The Court asked that "the statute
speak through the Board when the statute does not speak for itself." Ibid., at 196. This procedure, the Court believed, would "effectuate the policies of the Act by making workable the
system of restricted judicial review in relation to the wide discretionary authority which
Congress has given the Board." Ibid. On remand, the Board complied with these directions
and re-entered the same order, Matter of Phelps Dodge Corp., 35 N.L.R.B. 418 (1941),
which, for all that appears in any of the reports, was then enforced by the Circuit Court of
Appeals. The basis the Board provided for its order on remand was notably broad and general.
3M
Matter of Federal Water Service Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 5584 (194s).
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*question'of whether the Commission was to have some freedom to develop the
meaning of the statutory standards case by case so long as it stated the grounds
of its action clearly. The latter question was answered with a definite affirmative by the Supreme Court's reversal of the Court of Appeals. The question as to the meaning of the 1943 opinion, which would seem to be almost as
fair game for the dissent as the majority, was answered very clearly and unequivocally by Justice Murphy for the majority and just as clearly and unequivocally, and with more vigor, by Justice Jackson for the dissent. In Justice
Murphy's hands the 1943 opinion appeared to have been a fatherly admonition
to the Commission to explain itself more fully; this it had now done and could
therefore be sustained. In Justice Jackson's dissent, however, although he
avoided extended discussion of the 1943 opinion, it became lightning from the
heavens descending upon the "lawless" Commission.
As has been noted, none of the present majority had concurred in the earlier
opinion, and the three who were on the Court at the time it was handed down
had joined in a stiff dissent. Justice Murphy, speaking for the new majority, of
course gave the 1943 opinion the interpretation followed by the Commission.
Either one of the other two interpretations would have required a reversal
either of the Commission or of the 1943 decision itself. The majority favored
sustaining the Commission, and they apparently chose what seemed a convenient and economical way of doing it. By interpreting the earlier opinion as
simply calling for the fuller statement of the grounds for the Commission's
action which had now been supplied, the course of the litigation was given a
generally reassuring air of continuity and order. While the respondents probably failed to find reassurance in the decision, such an appearance of order is at
least one of the subsidiary goals of jurisprudence.
The effect of this artistic curtain speech was spoiled, however, by a violent
protest from the wings. Justice Jackson, in his dissent, with which the author
of the 1943 opinion agreed, accused the majority of making "judicial review of
administrative orders a hopeless formality for the litigant" and of "[reducing]
the judicial process in such cases to a mere feint."38 He portrayed himself as
reduced to comic perplexity39 by the sophistical reasoning of the majority.
Nevertheless, he proceeded to take severe exception to its pagan obeisance to
the principle of "judicial deference to administrative discretion," and characterized its action as "the first encouragement this Court has given to conscious lawlessness as a permissible rule of administrative action."40
The general line of the dissenting opinion seems to indicate that its subscribers now think a more definite action than a remand was in order on the
38 332 U.S. 194, 210 (1947)
39 "I give up. Now I realize fully what Mark Twain meant when he said, 'The more you
explain it, the more I don't understand it."' Ibid., at 214.

40 Ibid.,

at 217.
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first review.4' Or possibly, as has already been suggested, they interpreted the
remand as looking toward a re-entry of the same order only if a finding of actual
bad faith on the part of the management was made by the Commission.
It is difficult to say how feasible it would have been for the Commission to
supply this helpful ingredient as a basis for the later order. It insisted in its
second opinion42 and in its briefs that the Court had misconstrued its first
opinion by taking good faith to be conceded, when actually it had only been
assumed for purposes of argument, good or bad faith being irrelevant under the
principle it was applying. Nevertheless, it produced no evidence and made no
finding of bad faith in its second consideration of the case. This, as we have seen,
left the majority, whose objective was to sustain the Commission, with the
necessity of either making Justice Frankfurter's opinion serve their turn or
abandoning it completely. The opinion lent itself to the first alternative rather
better than the dissenters might have wished.
The present majority might have put itself in a stronger position by abandoning the previous decision and holding that the Commission should have been
sustained on the first review. This would have taken some wind out of the dissenters' sails, but would also have raised the law of the case problem and spotlighted the changes in personnel as the controlling factor. Moreover, it would
have been difficult to find any administrative law doctrine well-enough crystallized to provide a firm basis for calling the 1943 decision erroneous.
The case ptobably represents a step forward in the development of the conception of corporate powers as powers in trust, 43 at least with respect to this
particular situation,44 and also shows a tendency in this Court to narrow its
review of an administrative agency's case-by-case development of the broad
41See 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 75 (x946), noting Chenery Corp. v. SEC, 154 F. 2d 6 (App.
D.C., 1946), and advancing the proposition that the uncertainty of the first Supreme Court
opinion hid a fundamental split on the question of administrative discretion among the
justices of that Court.
29

,PMatter of Federal Water Service Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 5584, at
n. 28 (1945).
43See Berle and Means, The Modem Corporation and Private Property, Book II, Ch. VII

('933).
44 Subsequent cases decided by the SEC involving analogous problems indicate a disposition to limit the Chenery doctrine rather strictly to the facts of its own case. In these cases
the Commission states that it is considering a general rule to cover these situations. Matter of

Cities Service Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7720 (1947); Matter of American States

Utilities Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 7721 (z947). Concurring opinions by Commissioners McEntire and Hanrahan state their belief in the desirability of a general rule,
and that until the adoptioh of such a rule the Commission "should not impose the sanction of
limitation to cost except in a case where the conflict between the management's personal interests as traders and their duties as reorganization managers is actually so acute that it would
not be unreasonable to have expected the management to recognize such conflict at the same
time of the trading as raising at least an ethical problem." Matter of Cities Service Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 7720, at 2z (I947). Management-held stock was allowed full
participation in the reorganizations involved in both these cases.
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statutory standards it is charged with applying.45 It is equally interesting, however, as a problem in the coordination of judicial conviction with judicial convention.
SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT OF SHAREHOLDER
VOTING AGREEMENTS
An agreement was entered into in 1941 by two of the three shareholders in
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., a family corporation,
whereby they were to vote their stock jointly for a period of ten years. In the
event that they could not decide to their mutual satisfaction how their shares
were to be voted before any corporate election, the matter was to be submitted
to an arbitrator whose powers were to be "exercised to the end of assuring ....
good management [of the corporation] and such participation therein by the
members of the Ringling family as the experience, capacity and ability of each
[warranted]." The decision of the arbitrator in such a situation was to be binding on the contracting parties. The agreement also provided that each of the
parties was to have first option to purchase the other's stock in the event of a
decision to sell. Prior to the annual stockholders' meeting in 1946, the two shareholders could not agree as to how their votes should be cast in the election of
directors. The arbitrator whose services were utilized at the request of the plaintiff, directed that the parties to the agreement vote for her choice.' Thq defendant refused to comply with the award and voted contrary to it. The present suit
was brought to determine the validity of the election and the right of the elected
directors to hold office. 2 The Delaware Supreme Court held that the agreement
4s For an earlier enunciation of the principle, see FTC v. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 314
(i934). There the Court said, "While this Court has declared that it is for the courts to determine what practices or methods of competition are to be deemed unfair.... in passing on that
question the determination of the Commission is of weight. It was created with the avowed purpose of lodging the administrative functions committed to it in 'a body specially competent
to deal with them by reason of information, experience and careful study, of the business and
economic conditions of the industry affected,' and it was organized in such a manner ... as
would 'give to [its members] an opportunity to acquire the expertness in dealing with these
special questions concerning industry that comes from experience.' Report of Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, No. 597, June 13, 1914, 63d Cong. 2d Sess., pp. 9, 11." See also
Pound, The Administrative Application of Legal Standards, 44 Reports of the American Bar
Ass'n 445 (1919)-

xThe arbitrator first directed that the stock of both parties be voted for a 6o-day adjournment. The plaintiff voted her shares in pursuance of this order, but the defendant voted
against adjournment. Although the chairman ruled that the motion for adjournment had
carried by virtue of the voting agreement, the meeting proceeded to the election of directors.
The plaintiff stated that she would continue in the meeting "without prejudice to her position
with respect .... to the fact that adjournment had not been taken."
'The plaintiff and the defendant had sufficient votes (under a cumulative voting scheme)
to each elect two of the seven directors. By pooling their remaining votes they could elect an
additional candidate regardless of how the third shareholder voted. If the agreement were not
enforced, the third shareholder who held a slightly larger number of shares than either plaintiff
or defendant would control the choice of three directors.

